Rebellion
First off in this piece Dostoyevsky's character, Ivan, gives us an idea of the types of evil that exist in this world through examples of neglected and tortured children, the satisfaction parents get through torturing their children, and the abuse of animals. Through these examples Dostoyevsky brings the question to mind of what justifies this cruelty.
For example, a little boy hurt of the General's hound while the boy was playing. Then the General, in turn, stripped the boy of his clothes, sent him running, and released his hounds to kill him. Is that justified? Perhaps the child would have grown up to be a sinner. (A serial killer) By his death, would the world be saved of future evil? Does that make the General's decision to kill him right?
For something to be justified by the consequences associated with it, the good that comes out of it must justify the bad. Therefore, acts of evil cannot be justified by the positive outcomes at the sake of the negative consequences.
The siginificance of the title, "Rebellion", in this piece comes when Alyosha suggests that Ivan forgot that there is a God and who he was. A God who can forgive those who feel guilt for the killing of a child. Ivan argues with her by suggesting God would not allow a crime such as the torture and suffering of a child. Ivan accepts that God's judgement is good, bet he does not accept the world that God has created. He explains how he feels when talks about how he would rather kill himself than live in this world of evil.
Wednesday, February 29, 2012
Monday, February 27, 2012
Sigmund Freud
The Psychological Origins of Religion
It should first be noted that in order to understand the readings from Freud, a basic foundation of his principles should be available.
First, Freudian psychology focuses a great deal on the relationships of individuals between themselves and their mothers, fathers, siblings etc. From these relationships, Freud created what he called the basic foundations of the human person, what eventually became to be known as: id, ego, and superego.
Id: undifferentiated, unsocialized core of personality that contains the basic psychic energy and motivations
Ego: personality aspect that develops to deal with the real world.
Superego: personality structure that develops to internalize societal rules and goal-seeking behavior toward socially acceptable pursuits.
With his theory Freudian psychoanalytical theory then developed into psychosexual development within five stages. 1) oral stage, 2) anal stage, 3) phallic stage, 4) latency period, and 5) genital stage. Each of these stages, if properly navigated according to Freud lead to appropriate development and conduct of an individual; if not, they would find themselves stuck and have manifestations of the stages present in daily life (i.e. chewing pins, gum, anal retentive attitudes)
As it relates to the reading, Freud refers to the laws of the totem and how they pertain to the rules against killing, eating, etc., and then attempts to connect it to the father and what he deemed as the Oedipus complex. Apart of the phallic stage, the Oedipus complex refers to the rivalries young boys have with their fathers for the love and attention of their mothers (established in the oral stage). So how does this apply to religion, faith, God, and everything else we've covered thus far? Though I cannot entirely understand Freud's writings, to me he is trying to establish that religion and more so a relationship with God is an establishment of guilt from feelings against earthly fathers and a representation of trying to balance that guilt with awe and respect. He seems to suggest that we are jealous of our fathers, and even more so jealous of the fatherly God we cannot explain.
The readings go on to further touch upon the stages of development as the correspond to turning away from religion, and the establishment of the ego as it pertains to religion. In terms of the stages of development, it is during the phallic stage that attitudes and motives of jealousy are the most evident; once passed, an individual becomes more attuned with his or her ego which allows them to move past their jealously of fathers and male figures in general. In the case of the readings, the point at which the Oedipus complex ends and the gradual turning from religion occurs is Freud's "neurosis of humanity." The final points of Freud's readings are surrounded by where and when the sense of the ego originates. Freud argues that an individuals sense of ego does not initially come from an external world, that we learn to associate the ego with the outside world. He also comments that the ego-feeling is oceanic and it is comparable to a limitlessness and a bond with the universe. He finalizes his argument that religion is simply a return to infantile helplessness; that we cannot understand and that leaves us looking for the relationship and bond of awe or respect for a caregiver or God; the defense the ego uses as protection from an external threat.
It should first be noted that in order to understand the readings from Freud, a basic foundation of his principles should be available.
First, Freudian psychology focuses a great deal on the relationships of individuals between themselves and their mothers, fathers, siblings etc. From these relationships, Freud created what he called the basic foundations of the human person, what eventually became to be known as: id, ego, and superego.
Id: undifferentiated, unsocialized core of personality that contains the basic psychic energy and motivations
Ego: personality aspect that develops to deal with the real world.
Superego: personality structure that develops to internalize societal rules and goal-seeking behavior toward socially acceptable pursuits.
With his theory Freudian psychoanalytical theory then developed into psychosexual development within five stages. 1) oral stage, 2) anal stage, 3) phallic stage, 4) latency period, and 5) genital stage. Each of these stages, if properly navigated according to Freud lead to appropriate development and conduct of an individual; if not, they would find themselves stuck and have manifestations of the stages present in daily life (i.e. chewing pins, gum, anal retentive attitudes)
As it relates to the reading, Freud refers to the laws of the totem and how they pertain to the rules against killing, eating, etc., and then attempts to connect it to the father and what he deemed as the Oedipus complex. Apart of the phallic stage, the Oedipus complex refers to the rivalries young boys have with their fathers for the love and attention of their mothers (established in the oral stage). So how does this apply to religion, faith, God, and everything else we've covered thus far? Though I cannot entirely understand Freud's writings, to me he is trying to establish that religion and more so a relationship with God is an establishment of guilt from feelings against earthly fathers and a representation of trying to balance that guilt with awe and respect. He seems to suggest that we are jealous of our fathers, and even more so jealous of the fatherly God we cannot explain.
The readings go on to further touch upon the stages of development as the correspond to turning away from religion, and the establishment of the ego as it pertains to religion. In terms of the stages of development, it is during the phallic stage that attitudes and motives of jealousy are the most evident; once passed, an individual becomes more attuned with his or her ego which allows them to move past their jealously of fathers and male figures in general. In the case of the readings, the point at which the Oedipus complex ends and the gradual turning from religion occurs is Freud's "neurosis of humanity." The final points of Freud's readings are surrounded by where and when the sense of the ego originates. Freud argues that an individuals sense of ego does not initially come from an external world, that we learn to associate the ego with the outside world. He also comments that the ego-feeling is oceanic and it is comparable to a limitlessness and a bond with the universe. He finalizes his argument that religion is simply a return to infantile helplessness; that we cannot understand and that leaves us looking for the relationship and bond of awe or respect for a caregiver or God; the defense the ego uses as protection from an external threat.
Wednesday, February 22, 2012
What to make of Friedrich Nietzsche
As Timothy Robinson points out in his introduction to this
chapter, Nietzsche makes some very vexing points, but provides very little
argument to support them. This makes the meaning of his ideas ambiguous and calls
for broader examination.
It seems clear that Nietzsche means to suggest that religion
is nothing more than a mere tool to help the weak exert control over the
powerful. This takes a purely psychological view and presupposes that God does
not exist. What are we to make of this? Does he have the wrong idea? If he is
right and there is no God, is a search for greater morality really so bad, and
does it necessarily mean that the weak are only trying to gain a moral high-ground
and a righteous superiority to allow them to debase and overthrow the powerful?
The weak may be guilty only of attempting to find meaning in a life that they
ultimately have little or no control over, searching for means to rise above
the resentment that is caused by their poverty in comparison to the wealth of
the powerful. If he is wrong and God does exist, then he is obviously
neglecting, among many things, the pursuit of purity of the soul, boundless
peace, and everlasting life.
Nietzsche also makes the striking claim that “God is dead”
and that we are responsible for his murder. What exactly does he mean? Is he
alluding to the idea that we are replacing God with science and looking for
answers in the observable world and abandoning the teachings of divine
creation? Why not say that God provided us with science to give us yet another
path to discover and become closer to Him? Is he implying that religion as a
vehicle of control is responsible, virtually killing God before He had the
chance to be in the first place? His
view on religion as a tool has problems already discussed and does not fundamentally
prove the destruction of God. Perhaps he means that Priests, through the hate
he so adamantly believes they bear, have corrupted and destroyed God, but that,
again, appeals to his view that religion is simply an apparatus of supremacy. It
is very apparent that God is alive and well and we see the evidence of such
every day. While there are still many misguided individuals that do terrible
things and claim to do so in name of God, there are countless more that do
great things in God’s name as well. This proves that God, at the very least as
an idea, is not dead. If, however, Nietzsche is right and God is dead, is it really
the promising situation that he declares it to be? He states that the death of
God is not a frightening and dark thing, but a good thing. Something that
allows a new beginning and chance to see things in ways we never have before.
While that may be true, if we accept that God is dead then we must certainly
see things differently, is it really better? God provides solace and insight to
many and there is no precedent that proves that the absence of God would be an
improvement to their lives. Conversely, there may be much to gain by removing
the constraints of God from our thought, as Nietzsche suggests.Without God, we may be able to achieve the moral autonomy proposed by Rachels, which is something that I believe Nietzsche would hold in high regard.
Monday, February 20, 2012
The Possibility of Perception
Brian Davies raises a number of logical or conceptual objections to the idea of perceiving or experiencing God. Now, some people might wonder, why all this logical analysis of whether we can perceive God or not, don't we just know (isn't the proof in the pudding? But that is just the question we are trying to answer). Sometimes, conceptual and logical analysis allows us to rule "in" some things and rule "out" some things even before we get to the empirical data. And in the case of God, we often don't have empirical or 'raw' data to appeal to...so logic, metaphysics and conceptual analysis are the only real tools we have....its why philosophy of religion often seems 'abstract' to people.
So Davies wants to know, Can God be an object of experience? If we experience things as 'objects', as things that might be experienceable, doesn't that require that the thing be a thing? Is God a thing or object to be experienced? In addition, how do we 'experience' something that is not physical or material, or without sensory content? These are just a few of the issues that Davies tries to wade through. Notice, testimony does not get us very far, because then we are just relying and trusting others. Which is fine for a lot of knowledge, but then we have to ask the question: "Is this testimony reliable rather than "Is this an experience of God?
There are additional, more substantive worries about knowledge from experience, especially knowledge of God. These break down into 3 types of worries:
Davies spends considerable time and analyzes each of these objections, eventually arguing for a hesitant yes to the possibility of experiencing God, although he thinks there are likely better ways (we will get to these in about a month). This brings up a point he makes at the beginning of the piece on two different ways we reach the "Truth" or gain knowledge, direct and indirect. The first requires experiential evidence, i.e we have to have direct experience of something. This is where "experiencing" God fits in. However, even if this fails, there is still the possibility of indirect proofs for God's existence based on well-formed and reasonable inference. This is how other famous arguments like the Cosmological Argument, the Ontological Argument, and the Design argumet work...and we will spend some time on these later.
So, what lead's Davies to conclude that experience of God is at least plausible? First, he thinks we can overcome and address the worries raised above. In particular, he thinks that Hume's criticisms (3a-c) are overblown, and that we do have some uniformity of testimony, especially among Christian belief. Still, we must overcome another objection. If we claim to 'experience' God, can we 'recognize' that it is God? This is a question that leads us back to our initial conversation about who or what God is, and how we might know what/who that being is. Thus, questions on the nature of God are never fully divorced from questions concerning his existence....and as we will see with Aquinas, this makes sense if Aquinas is right that God's nature is existence.
So Davies wants to know, Can God be an object of experience? If we experience things as 'objects', as things that might be experienceable, doesn't that require that the thing be a thing? Is God a thing or object to be experienced? In addition, how do we 'experience' something that is not physical or material, or without sensory content? These are just a few of the issues that Davies tries to wade through. Notice, testimony does not get us very far, because then we are just relying and trusting others. Which is fine for a lot of knowledge, but then we have to ask the question: "Is this testimony reliable rather than "Is this an experience of God?
There are additional, more substantive worries about knowledge from experience, especially knowledge of God. These break down into 3 types of worries:
(1) Experience often deceptive.
(2) People who claim to see God influenced by social or psychological factors rather than really seeing God
(3) Hume= any proclaimed experience of God must be “rejected at the outset (3a) because there are no agreed tests for verifying”…..”(3b) because some people report an experience of an absence of God, and (3c) because there is no uniformity of testimony….” (122)
Davies spends considerable time and analyzes each of these objections, eventually arguing for a hesitant yes to the possibility of experiencing God, although he thinks there are likely better ways (we will get to these in about a month). This brings up a point he makes at the beginning of the piece on two different ways we reach the "Truth" or gain knowledge, direct and indirect. The first requires experiential evidence, i.e we have to have direct experience of something. This is where "experiencing" God fits in. However, even if this fails, there is still the possibility of indirect proofs for God's existence based on well-formed and reasonable inference. This is how other famous arguments like the Cosmological Argument, the Ontological Argument, and the Design argumet work...and we will spend some time on these later.
So, what lead's Davies to conclude that experience of God is at least plausible? First, he thinks we can overcome and address the worries raised above. In particular, he thinks that Hume's criticisms (3a-c) are overblown, and that we do have some uniformity of testimony, especially among Christian belief. Still, we must overcome another objection. If we claim to 'experience' God, can we 'recognize' that it is God? This is a question that leads us back to our initial conversation about who or what God is, and how we might know what/who that being is. Thus, questions on the nature of God are never fully divorced from questions concerning his existence....and as we will see with Aquinas, this makes sense if Aquinas is right that God's nature is existence.
Monday, February 13, 2012
Theresa, James, and Religious Experience: Take 1
One of the most famous sculptures by Gian Lorenzo Bernini sits in the Cornaro Chapel in Santa Maria del Vittorio in Rome. It is entitled The Ecstasy of Saint Theresa, seen here. http://www2.2space.net/images/upl_newsImage/1241203211.jpg
What is this sculpture trying to portray? How does it connect to belief in God?
Saint Theresa became famous as one of the leading mystical figures in the history of the Catholic Church, alongside Saint John of the Cross, Meister Exhart (who was controversially tried but died before verdict by the local Inquisition), and most recently Pope John Paul II and Thomas Merton. Theresa thought, through her experiences, that she could offer criteria and a deeper understanding of the nature of God, prayer and our relationship through a re-counting of her way to God. Theresa offered a model of (mystical) prayer that proceeded along 4 levels. The first "mental prayer" involved contemplation or concentration and involved a withdrawal or removal of the soul from the everyday world. The second "prayer of quiet" involves a complete renunciation of the human desiring and willing sphere to God. "The devotion of union" is a state of prayer that involves supernatural grace, and goes beyond human comprehension to reach a level of "ecstatic union" with the Divine. The final and highest stage, "the devotion of ecstasy or rapture" is a purely passive state, where we reside in the Divine Presence and all connection with the sensory or body is gone. These 4 levels, according to Theresa, help us reach closer to God and know his nature and will. Similarly, all of these figures are held up as exemplars of those who communed with God in a deeply personal sense. So through mystical experience, we might get a better idea of who or what God is.
They also lend suggestive evidence to the idea that the best proof of anything is through sensory experience. Just as I can prove the existence of my hand by seeing it, feeling it, and well using it, so too can we experience God by an experience of the Divine.
These famous religious mystics are not alone in the claim that they experience God. Many everyday believers claim to have 'experienced' God. But what does it mean to experience God? Is the everyday believer's relationship with God an 'experience' of God? Is an 'experience' of God limited to God speaking through the burning bush to Moses, or walking with Abraham, or speaking to the prophets? What about the experience of religious mystics?
The 'experience' of God also raises all sorts of questions about religious pluralism (which itself is not an easy thing to define...see http://www.religioustolerance.org/rel_plur1.htm ). Do mystics from different religious traditions experience the same Divine Presence? What do we say about differing accounts of God in this experience? While "experience of God" is the most direct and straightforward 'proof' for God's existence, it is far from easy.
William James attempts to answer some (or many) of these questions. Just as he does in our earlier reading, James tries to make philosophical and psychological sense of mystical and religious experience. James himself had very interesting ideas on the details and ways to achieve mystical experience, and even allowed and encouraged the use of certain drugs to achieve mystical states. Again, we see James' Counsel of Courage (vs. Clifford's Counsel of Caution) in action. Is this a good thing? What else does James have to add in "the Reality of the Unseen"? What James means by the Unseen and his focus in this piece is not always clear, and will be something (else) to consider in our discussion.
What is this sculpture trying to portray? How does it connect to belief in God?
Saint Theresa became famous as one of the leading mystical figures in the history of the Catholic Church, alongside Saint John of the Cross, Meister Exhart (who was controversially tried but died before verdict by the local Inquisition), and most recently Pope John Paul II and Thomas Merton. Theresa thought, through her experiences, that she could offer criteria and a deeper understanding of the nature of God, prayer and our relationship through a re-counting of her way to God. Theresa offered a model of (mystical) prayer that proceeded along 4 levels. The first "mental prayer" involved contemplation or concentration and involved a withdrawal or removal of the soul from the everyday world. The second "prayer of quiet" involves a complete renunciation of the human desiring and willing sphere to God. "The devotion of union" is a state of prayer that involves supernatural grace, and goes beyond human comprehension to reach a level of "ecstatic union" with the Divine. The final and highest stage, "the devotion of ecstasy or rapture" is a purely passive state, where we reside in the Divine Presence and all connection with the sensory or body is gone. These 4 levels, according to Theresa, help us reach closer to God and know his nature and will. Similarly, all of these figures are held up as exemplars of those who communed with God in a deeply personal sense. So through mystical experience, we might get a better idea of who or what God is.
They also lend suggestive evidence to the idea that the best proof of anything is through sensory experience. Just as I can prove the existence of my hand by seeing it, feeling it, and well using it, so too can we experience God by an experience of the Divine.
These famous religious mystics are not alone in the claim that they experience God. Many everyday believers claim to have 'experienced' God. But what does it mean to experience God? Is the everyday believer's relationship with God an 'experience' of God? Is an 'experience' of God limited to God speaking through the burning bush to Moses, or walking with Abraham, or speaking to the prophets? What about the experience of religious mystics?
The 'experience' of God also raises all sorts of questions about religious pluralism (which itself is not an easy thing to define...see http://www.religioustolerance.org/rel_plur1.htm ). Do mystics from different religious traditions experience the same Divine Presence? What do we say about differing accounts of God in this experience? While "experience of God" is the most direct and straightforward 'proof' for God's existence, it is far from easy.
William James attempts to answer some (or many) of these questions. Just as he does in our earlier reading, James tries to make philosophical and psychological sense of mystical and religious experience. James himself had very interesting ideas on the details and ways to achieve mystical experience, and even allowed and encouraged the use of certain drugs to achieve mystical states. Again, we see James' Counsel of Courage (vs. Clifford's Counsel of Caution) in action. Is this a good thing? What else does James have to add in "the Reality of the Unseen"? What James means by the Unseen and his focus in this piece is not always clear, and will be something (else) to consider in our discussion.
Sunday, February 12, 2012
A defense of Faith without proof
In light of Pascal's 'failure' for a pragmatic proof to God's existence, the theist still is confronted by Clifford's challenge: Give me some evidence, some proof, or your belief is not only irrational, its blameworthy. Or, if Clifford's challenge is too strong, Flew's milder version is just as damaging to the theist: If you don't have reasons on your side, then the proper response is to remain at the starting point of the debate, negative atheism.
Either way, without some argument, the theist is left in a tough place. But James reminds us, and shifts the debate, that as humans we are not just knowledge seeking-beings, we are also "passional" one's as well.
What does James mean by "passional being"? This requires considerable unpacking and its not always clear from the text we read. But James, a philosopher and psychologist, had much to say about the passions or emotions, see here for one example> http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/James/emotion.htm
For James, as humans, we are not solely guided by 'cognitive' aspects of our being but also 'passional' ones, our emotions, feelings, desires. Moreover, sometimes we have to simply choose, or let the 'will' guide our action in one direction? Why, because those situations are indeterminate, neither option is definitive over the other. James suggests that maybe religion is one such 'genuine option' and thus, we are not only forced, but rationally required to choose.
In this, James has some parallels with Pascal. Unlike Pascal, James explains why we really only have two options (like Pascal).
So what do we think? Is James right? Do we only have two options, theism or atheism? What reasons does James to give for this. What about his claims to our 'passional nature'? Is James on to something, and if so what? Does the research below support James' view, go against it, or is it irrelevant:
Wednesday, February 1, 2012
Clifford and Belief
Clifford asks us to look at the big picture about our beliefs before then addressing the issue of religious belief. Specifically, Clifford argues that we have an "ethics" of belief, or in other words, that we should believe some things and should not believe other things. Why? Because beliefs matter. What we do with our beliefs have significant and potentially disastrous consequences.
To see this, Clifford offers two different stories, each with two variations (the shipowner and the 'persecution' story). The general moral Clifford develops is what he calls the Evidentialist Principle- never believe on insufficient evidence. Notice, what Clifford is getting at here is that "believing' requires "reasons". In other words, our default position is nonbelief (or being neutral). To believe anything, we have to have some reason or motivation to believe that, and the reason must be something involve "sufficient evidence."
If we apply this to religious belief, Clifford thinks that we have to radically rethink our religious commitments. This is because he thinks that we never have sufficient evidence for religious belief and thus we have a duty not to believe.
Clifford offers some powerful examples, but his evidentialist principle and his claim to "ethics" of belief raises a number of question/issues.
First, is he right that we should never believe on insufficient evidence? We will see that a future reading (the James piece) questions this claim for a number of reasons. But secondly, how many of our beliefs in general are based on sufficient evidence? I believe that India has a billion people (or more). But I have never counted them, nor have I even been to India. To be precise, I cannot even guarantee that India exists, let alone has 1 or 1 billion people. A lot of our everyday 'knowledge' comes from the testimony of others. Does this make it "unusable".
Another issue with Clifford's position is in figuring out what type of 'duty' we have in terms of our beliefs? Is it a moral duty? Do we have a moral duty always to believe what is true and only what is true? Why? Some people might claim that sometimes the truth gets in the way of doing the 'right' thing? Or, what about when our 'duty' to know the truth gets in the way of doing other morally required things? Do I take a trip to India to prove it exists and has a billion people or do I use that money to donate to the poor?
If Clifford is not thinking of a moral duty, maybe he is thinking of an epistemic duty. Maybe, one of our 'roles' or aspects as knowledge seeking beings is that, in the sphere of knowing, we should always be cautious to avoid falsehood. But here, we might question whether this is the best way to go about seeking new knowledge.
Nevertheless, Clifford seems to be right about a few things. (1) Beliefs matter. Beliefs can affect action and conduct. So if we have bad beliefs, they can lead to horrible things. Think about the Crusades, the Witch Trials, maybe even the Patriot Act. (2) It seems like we need some criteria for good/bad beliefs. If a friend believes that the world is flat....we generally question their sanity, let alone their judgment. I once had a friend who was utterly convinced that all leather came from crocodiles. Despite 7 of us at dinner arguing otherwise, he would not believe us. What do we do in these situations? (3) How do we figure out the quality of religious beliefs?
Finally, one easy way to counter Clifford's whole argument is simply to 'pony up' and give the evidence. We will explore this route in a few weeks.
To see this, Clifford offers two different stories, each with two variations (the shipowner and the 'persecution' story). The general moral Clifford develops is what he calls the Evidentialist Principle- never believe on insufficient evidence. Notice, what Clifford is getting at here is that "believing' requires "reasons". In other words, our default position is nonbelief (or being neutral). To believe anything, we have to have some reason or motivation to believe that, and the reason must be something involve "sufficient evidence."
If we apply this to religious belief, Clifford thinks that we have to radically rethink our religious commitments. This is because he thinks that we never have sufficient evidence for religious belief and thus we have a duty not to believe.
Clifford offers some powerful examples, but his evidentialist principle and his claim to "ethics" of belief raises a number of question/issues.
First, is he right that we should never believe on insufficient evidence? We will see that a future reading (the James piece) questions this claim for a number of reasons. But secondly, how many of our beliefs in general are based on sufficient evidence? I believe that India has a billion people (or more). But I have never counted them, nor have I even been to India. To be precise, I cannot even guarantee that India exists, let alone has 1 or 1 billion people. A lot of our everyday 'knowledge' comes from the testimony of others. Does this make it "unusable".
Another issue with Clifford's position is in figuring out what type of 'duty' we have in terms of our beliefs? Is it a moral duty? Do we have a moral duty always to believe what is true and only what is true? Why? Some people might claim that sometimes the truth gets in the way of doing the 'right' thing? Or, what about when our 'duty' to know the truth gets in the way of doing other morally required things? Do I take a trip to India to prove it exists and has a billion people or do I use that money to donate to the poor?
If Clifford is not thinking of a moral duty, maybe he is thinking of an epistemic duty. Maybe, one of our 'roles' or aspects as knowledge seeking beings is that, in the sphere of knowing, we should always be cautious to avoid falsehood. But here, we might question whether this is the best way to go about seeking new knowledge.
Nevertheless, Clifford seems to be right about a few things. (1) Beliefs matter. Beliefs can affect action and conduct. So if we have bad beliefs, they can lead to horrible things. Think about the Crusades, the Witch Trials, maybe even the Patriot Act. (2) It seems like we need some criteria for good/bad beliefs. If a friend believes that the world is flat....we generally question their sanity, let alone their judgment. I once had a friend who was utterly convinced that all leather came from crocodiles. Despite 7 of us at dinner arguing otherwise, he would not believe us. What do we do in these situations? (3) How do we figure out the quality of religious beliefs?
Finally, one easy way to counter Clifford's whole argument is simply to 'pony up' and give the evidence. We will explore this route in a few weeks.
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